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1. Introduction

	In the philosophy of biology community, much of the discussion about reductionism has traditionally focused on one instance of a purported reduction: the reduction of classical Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics.  Recently, however, Alexander Rosenberg brought the biological project of ‘computing the embryo’ to the attention of philosophers of biology (Rosenberg 1997), and claimed that developmental biology is being reduced to molecular biology.  The old philosophical debate over reductionism, manifesting its protean character, can thereby be fought on new ground.  Rosenberg’s article prompted a spirited response from Laubichler and Wagner (Laubichler and Wagner 2001), who cite a formidable array of experimental findings intended to impugn Rosenberg’s reductionist view of development.  Unfortunately, Laubichler and Wagner do not always spell out exactly how and why these detailed examples refute a reductionist position.  In this essay, I first argue that although their examples would refute a very strong reductionism (of the form one might find in the classics (Schaffner 1967, 1969)), a more moderate or sophisticated reductionist could successfully respond to their examples.  Then I describe, in general, what an example of a finding that would refute this moderate reductionism could look like, and finally point out an actual example that poses a problem for the reductionist. 
	Before I plunge into the details of this particular interchange concerning reductionism in developmental biology, I will briefly address a larger question: what motivates the attempt to construct a tenable ‘moderate’ reductionism?  What is the value of examining whether moderate reductionism succeeds or fails?  (By ‘moderate,’ I mean a reductionism whose aim is not to show the reduced piece of science superfluous.) The main motivation I see for examining whether moderate reductionism can succeed or not can be loosely put as follows.  We have, at present, several specialized subdisciplines of scientific knowledge, many of which purport to deal with the same object of study. For any two or more of these disciplines, the person interested in a synoptic view of science can ask: how are these disciplines related to each other?  Are they more or less independent of one another, or are there significant connections between them?  Furthermore, if there are connections, how strong and how extensive are they?  Generally, the issue of whether reductionism succeeds or not arises when we attempt to attain a more synoptic view of human knowledge of the natural world: is it fundamentally fragmentary and pluralistic, or can it be substantially integrated in ways hidden by our current subdivisions into specialized disciplines?  I realize that this characterization has been couched in somewhat vague terms; in this essay, these questions are cashed out in the more specific form: can one of the disciplines explain (all of) the results of the other, or not?  Can the findings of molecular biology textbooks and research articles explain the findings reported in developmental biology articles and texts?
	In this exchange between Laubichler and Wagner on the one hand and Rosenberg on the other, I discern the following separable questions, which are not separated in the actual interchange:
(i) What is the working program of practicing biologists who study the molecular basis of development?  What are they trying to explain?

(ii) In developmental biology, what are the important or significant explananda? 

(iii) Can development of morphological features be predicted or explained using only molecular terms and the rules governing molecular interactions?  In the terms employed in the Rosenberg/ Laubichler & Wagner dispute, this question is: does ‘molecular syntax’ suffice to predict or explain developmental morphology?
I will deal only with (iii.), since it is central to the question of whether development can be somehow reduced to molecular biology.  I see (i) as a sociological question, though, of course, the results of the practicing scientists’ research program will constitute the ‘raw material’ of any putative reduction.  I take (ii) to be (at least partly) a pragmatic question, since it deals with which types of explanations are most desirable or valuable to scientists.  Ever since Aristotle introduced his four aitiai (or ‘causes’), many philosophers of science have held that there can be two explanations of a single phenomenon, neither of which is the sole ‘correct’ or ‘real’ one.  Which of the two explanations is the ‘better’ one is determined by pragmatic factors,​[1]​ i.e., by one’s own estimation of which goals are more valuable, what information is more interesting or illuminating.  Thus, with reference to our particular case, I believe it could be that molecular biology can (in some sense) reductively explain developmental biology, even if certain groups of developmental biologists did not consider molecular biology to be a valuable or illuminating reductive explanation of developmental phenomena.

2. Laubichler and Wagner’s target
Myriad models of reduction abound in the philosophical literature, and there is not room here to catalogue every proposed position.  Furthermore, for the purposes of this essay, such an exercise would not be very useful: my aim is to examine whether Laubichler and Wagner’s criticisms apply to the particular version of reductionism that they target in their critique.  I will refer to the standard works on the topic of reduction in biology in order to situate and to clarify this dispute, but my focus will be upon the version of reductionism Laubichler and Wagner attack. Rosenberg’s original article does not contain a detailed description, at a general or abstract level, of the general reductionist position in developmental biology, so they have some leeway in depicting the reductionist stance.  So, how do Laubichler and Wagner portray the reductionist about developmental biology?  They characterize their opponent as someone who believes that two elements are sufficient for “prediction” and “explanation” of development (2001, 62): “[i.] the participating molecules and [ii.] their rules of interaction,” or “molecular syntax” (2001, 63).  I will embed these two elements in a more general characterization of reductions due to Sahotra Sarkar, so that we can see how this particular purported reduction relates to other cases of reduction.  Sarkar claims that any reduction must have an ‘F-realm’ and ‘F-rules,’ which abbreviate ‘Fundamental realm’ and ‘Fundamental rules’ (Sarkar 1998, 45).​[2]​  ‘Fundamental’ in Sarkar’s model roughly corresponds to ‘reducing’ in the traditional terminology.​[3]​    
(i) F-terms.  According to Laubichler and Wagner, the reductionist claims “all biological properties are nothing but combinations of molecular properties” (2001, 64).  This asserts that a given developmental-level predicate can be translated (in some sense, of which more presently) into an expression that uses only predicates from the molecular level.  Thus, employing Sarkar’s general framework, the molecular level is the F-realm of this putative reduction.  Put otherwise, developmental concepts are ‘reducible’ to molecular concepts.  I will call the latter F-terms or F-concepts, though this is not Sarkar’s own language; these are the linguistic resources available to describe the ‘F-realm.’  The linguistically-inclined can think of this collection of terms as the ‘molecular vocabulary,’ abbreviated ‘VM’.  In short, the F-terms describe the properties and entities of the F-realm. 
(ii) F-Rules.  A reductionist about development would have to maintain that the mechanisms or rules that govern interactions between molecules are sufficient to derive or ‘explain’ in some sense the regularities at the developmental level of description (in combination with the F-terms).  What sorts of ‘mechanisms’ are these in the case of molecular biology?  I will not go into detail about this, since neither Rosenberg nor Laubichler & Wagner do; rather, I will simply assume that these are basically identical to the ‘F-rules’ of molecular biology that Sarkar employs.  Sarkar calls these F-rules the rules of “macromolecular physics”​[4]​ (Sarkar 1998, 174. See this chapter for a fuller specification of what ‘macromolecular physics’ is.).  These F-rules are not like the stereotypical version of physical laws, which some philosophers think are completely universal and ultimate, having no reference to specific locations or entities (Salmon 1992). 
Putting (i) and (ii) together, the thesis Laubichler and Wagner target is the following: development of morphological features can be appropriately explained and/or predicted invoking only (i) molecular predicates along with adequate translations of molecular language into developmental language and (ii) molecular rules of interaction alone.  (More will be said about these highly controversial ‘adequate translations,’ also known as ‘bridge laws’ or ‘connections,’ in section 3.1.) Thus, using Sarkar’s terminology, the central question dividing the two sides in this debate becomes: can the development of the embryo be explained by or reduced to (and perhaps predicted by) the terms and rules of ‘macromolecular physics’ alone? Or would additional rules or vocabulary have to be assumed to explain and/ or predict developmental morphology?  So, what would constitute a victory for Laubichler and Wagner? Either (not-(i)) there is a developmental biological property which is not a ‘combination of molecular properties’ alone, or (not-(ii)) there is a developmental process that cannot be predicted/ explained using only molecular rules of interaction.
In general, a successful reduction requires that every higher level term be ‘connectable’ to the lower level terms and rules alone (then (i) is satisfied) and every higher level rule of interaction be ‘derivable’ from the F-rules and F-terms alone (then (ii) is satisfied).​[5]​  There can be cases in which one of these conditions is met but the other is not.  The putative ‘reduction’ of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics probably provides an example of a case in which (i) is satisfied, but (ii) is not.  In this reduction, the F-terms are position, momentum, and volume, for a many particle system.  We can describe the upper-level predicates of temperature and pressure in terms of the F-terms and some mathematical probability theory.  The F-rules are Newton’s dynamical equations or the equations of quantum mechanics.  However, we cannot deduce from these rules alone certain higher-level thermodynamic rules, since the dynamical equations are time-reversal invariant.  We must assume an extra postulate, in addition to the F-rules of statistical mechanics, in order to derive all the thermodynamic regularities.  This additional posit is sometimes called the ‘statistical postulate,’ and it places a “constraint on probabilities of the initial conditions of systems characterized at the micro-level” that does not exist in statistical mechanics alone (Sklar 1993, 368).  Without this addition, certain thermodynamic regularities cannot be derived.  No new ontology is added to the system, so connectability is satisfied; however, the ‘reduction’ can only carry if an extra assumption above and beyond the original F-rules is supposed.  It is in this slightly subtle sense that certain philosophers of physics have suggested that thermodynamics is not reducible to the classical mechanics of ensembles (ibid., 370).

3. Laubichler and Wagner’s criticisms of reductionism
Returning to the reduction of developmental to molecular biology, Laubichler and Wagner marshal an array of research findings that are intended to impugn Rosenberg’s proposed reduction.​[6]​  Some of their arguments apply only to untenably strong versions of reductionism, as we shall see.  In the following subsections, I present Laubichler and Wagner’s criticisms of reductionism in developmental biology, and offer replies a reductionist could give.  The overall aim of this section is to show that Laubichler and Wagner’s arguments and examples fail to definitively refute reductionism 
3.1. Genetic redundancy, mesenchymal limb-bud aggregation, and many-one relations  
One biological phenomenon which Laubichler and Wagner believe counts against the reductionist is the existence of “genetic redundancy.”  However, it is not entirely clear that this finding constitutes strong evidence against the reductionist.  The biological fact is this: if the gene Hoxa-11 (which “is involved in the development of lower limb formation in all tetrapods”) is knocked out in a mouse, the mouse still develops its lower limbs, because the gene Hoxd-11 takes over and helps develop the lower arm (2001, 59).  However, the inference from ‘genetic redundancy exists’ to ‘reductionism is impugned’ is doubtful. Laubichler & Wagner claim that “a molecular…explanation of a developmental phenomenon… only makes sense if there is” such “a strong causal relationship between particular molecular events and the phenomenon to be explained” (ibid.), where by ‘strong causal relationship’ they apparently mean that the same effect cannot be produced by two distinct causes.  Framing their point in more general terms, Laubichler and Wager are asserting that the relationship between molecular-level descriptions and developmental-level descriptions is many-one; put otherwise, developmental kinds are ‘multiply-realizable’ by molecular kinds.  They offer two other examples which have the same form.  First, ‘axis differentiation’ is supposedly not reducible to molecular biology, since the protein that regulates it in Drosophila (Bicoid) does not regulate axis differentiation in most other organisms: “the role of axis determination can be played by many different molecular mechanisms” (2001, 65).  Second, Laubichler and Wagner cite the fact that mesenchymal limb bud cells have a tendency to aggregate in many different species, even though the various species’ limb bud cells have very different molecular constitution, and the chemical reaction responsible for the attraction of the cells to one another is different  (2001, 60). 
Now, there is a tradition in the debate over reduction in biology more generally that asserts the following: if upper-level kinds are multiply-realized by lower-level kinds, then the anti-reductionist wins the debate.  As Sterelny and Griffiths put it, “the claim that the theoretical entities of classic genetics are multiply realized at the molecular level is the core of the antireductionist consensus” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 139). How does the existence of two or more distinct reducing-level causes, each sufficient to produce a reduced-level effect, cast the possibility of a reduction into doubt? Certain characterizations of reduction in biology assume that the statements that ‘bridge’ the reducing level and the reduced one are “synthetic identities,” following (Schaffner 1967, 1993) and (Wimsatt 1976), and thus must take the logical form of biconditionals. So, the original critical observation that there were many-one relations between the molecular genetic level and the classical Mendelian level was useful when first proposed (Hull 1972), since this directly attacked the applicability of Schaffner’s model to the reduction of classical genetics, since his model demands biconditionals.
However, other reductionists might agree with Hull that the connections between lower and upper levels are not synthetic identities, yet maintain that reductions occur—they are just not adequately captured by Schaffner’s model.  Ernest Nagel’s seminal work on reduction allows that the connections between the reducing and reduced terms can be one-way conditionals or biconditionals (Nagel 1979, 355).  And this is Sarkar’s position as well.  Given the state of putative reductions in the biological sciences, identity is likely too strong a requirement on the connections, since there is a many-one relation between the molecular and classical genetic levels.  In many cases, as Sarkar points out, all we need to carry out a successful reduction are conditionals of the form: ‘If reducing-level conditions X hold, then reduced-level conditions Y hold.’  If we insist on biconditionals, then there can be no reductions if higher-level properties are multiply-realized by lower-level properties (since one higher-level property corresponds to many lower level ones, e.g., a single temperature corresponds to very many distinct microconditions), and putative reductions are eliminated by a purely philosophical demand.  So, even if Rosenberg himself believes that biconditionals or identities are necessary to carry out a reduction of developmental to molecular biology, such a belief could be jettisoned by a reductionist.​[7]​  
Sarkar, arguing for the acceptability of using conditionals for the connections, writes: “[n]either Schaffner nor Wimsatt offer any logical ground for the superiority of the biconditional” (Sarkar 1998, 33-4).  However, logical grounds can be found in (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, 10): if each term in the upper-level theory is connected via a biconditional to some term in the lower-level theory, then, as a matter of logic, the upper-level theory can be derived from the lower level one.  That is, if the connections are biconditionals, then connectability entails derivability; the reduction can be performed directly.​[8]​  However, biconditional connections are not necessary for reduction, and Kemeny and Oppenheim criticize the requirement of biconditional connections as an “oversimplification” that has “no justification” (1956, 13). Even the seminal anti-reductionist David Hull does not think the many-one relation between lower and upper levels disproves reductionism.  He claims this relation only entails that “any possible reduction will be complex” (1974, 39), not that reductionism fails in such cases (he goes on to say that a one-many relationship renders a reduction “impossible”).  The foregoing parade of celebrity opinion is intended to show that the inference from ‘upper-level kinds are multiply-realized’ to ‘reduction fails’ is at least questionable, and it has been rejected by reductionists and anti-reductionists alike, usually on the grounds that such a requirement would exclude many putative reductions. Now, if one believes that a sufficient condition for any reduction to fail is that there exists a many-one relationship between lower and upper-level terms, then developmental biology cannot be reduced to molecular biology, as the Laubichler and Wagner’s examples show.  But if one holds that belief, Sarkar comes out as an anti-reductionist about classical genetics, and it runs counter to the model of reduction with which Kemeny and Oppenheim, Nagel, Hull, and Sarkar all operate.  If a reductionist does not require the connections to be biconditionals, then pointing out that distinct molecular causes can have the same developmental effect perhaps loses its sting as a critique of reductionists.  
I say the many-one objection ‘perhaps’ loses its bite because, for the purposes of the reductionism debate, there are two importantly different ways in which the connections between the lower and upper levels can be many-one.  I have characterized many-one relations in a very general way: many distinct lower-level states are mapped onto a single upper-level state.  But there is a further question: how are these several lower-level states related to one another?  They could be similar, in molecular terms (i.e., similar with respect to lower-level variables), or dissimilar.  (I will refer to these as the ‘first’ and ‘second’ types of many-one relations.)  The second kind of many-one relationship is depicted and discussed in (Fodor 1974, 109): items (entities, processes, states) that are dissimilar from the lower-level ‘point of view’ are mapped to the same upper level item.  The reductionist would perhaps be pleased if the many-one relations took the first form, for then the unity of the upper-level state or term is explained, or at least rendered unsurprising, by the similarity of the lower-level states.  
With respect to the second type of many-one relationship, the issue becomes murky, and threatens to devolve into a linguistic dispute about what counts as a reduction.  Note first that we still have the set of conditionals Sarkar claims is needed to connect the two levels.  The worry the reductionist must contend with is that the molecular conditions described in the antecedents of those conditionals are unrelated and dissimilar, so that the molecular perspective alone could not capture why there is unity at the upper level.  Some might claim this does not endanger the reduction.  However, this type of many-one relation may be what the anti-reductionist has in mind when she stresses the ‘autonomy’ of the higher level.  And more importantly for our purposes, this also seems to be the most appropriate model for Laubichler and Wagner’s remarks on mesenchymal cells’ aggregation and axis determination, mentioned above.  The fact that axis differentiation is mediated by Bicoid in Drosophila but by completely different molecules in other organisms shows, for the anti-reductionist, that axis differentiation is at least not directly correlated with molecular facts, as it would be if the first type of many-one relation held.   My intuition is that one could still call oneself some sort of moderate reductionist if the upper-level kinds were dissimilar from a lower level perspective; but this seems to be a matter of nomenclature, not substance.  	
3.2. Same molecules – different developmental effects.  Let us consider another concrete biological fact that Laubichler and Wagner present in defense of their position. Put abstractly, these are attempts to show that the relationship between the lower and upper levels are one-many.​[9]​  The reductionist would likely be decisively refuted if the relations between developmental and molecular biology were one-many.​[10]​  In philosophical jargon, this is equivalent to the claim that supervenience fails: there is an upper level difference without a lower level difference.  They offer two biological examples in which “the same biochemical pathways following the same syntactical rules can lead to different morphological outcomes” (Laubichler & Wagner 2001, 63). 
(a.)  The “same pathway,” involving the wingless protein, the sonic hedgehog protein, and zest-white 3 kinase, “not only is involved in the formation of segment boundaries in Drosophila, but also specifies the proximodistal axis in the eye, leg, and wing imaginal disc.” (2001, 63). (One pathway- many developmental effects)

(b.) “The sonic hedgehog protein…activates different proteins in different contexts or morphogenetic fields.”  Its role in limb bud development is different from its role in the development of the nerve cord (2001, 63).  (One molecule- many developmental effects) 
They conclude: “As these examples demonstrate…not even a complete account of the molecular interactions (molecular syntax) can explain how these molecular interactions are causally linked to the spatial and temporal differentiation of particular morphological structures” (ibid.).  
I do not see how ‘a given protein activates different proteins in different contexts’ (i.e., (b.)) shows that molecular predicates and rules of molecular interactions alone cannot explain development of morphological features, unless the ‘context’ could not be spelled out in purely molecular terms. Thus, Rosenberg could respond to Laubichler and Wagner’s critical comments roughly as follows: assume that (a.) is true, so that the same biochemical pathways lead to different morphological results in “the insect leg” and in “the vertebrate body axis” (2001, 63). Couldn’t one be interested in answering why the same set of molecules has different effects, above and beyond ‘one is in the leg, and the other is in the axis’? ​[11]​  There are myriad molecular differences between an insect leg and vertebrate’s body axis—we would perhaps like to pin down which difference makes the effective causal difference at a more fine-grained resolution than ‘insect leg’/ ‘vertebrate axis.’  Thus, it is likely a mistake to view this as a true one-many situation, since the complete molecular description of the pathway in the insect leg and in the vertebrate axis will likely be different, not one and the same.  If researchers could not find such a difference between the two, reductionism would be disproved.  Now, this is certainly possible—it is a matter of empirical research, not armchair speculation.  Molecular biologists working on development have not yet discovered all the molecular information needed to reduce developmental to molecular biology, and they may not.  Rosenberg’s claim is only that such a reduction is beginning, piecemeal, to happen in practice, and he speculates that this will continue.  Rosenberg claims “in the long run the cellular milieu cannot serve as a ‘black box’…that is the whole point of the ‘computability’ claim” (1997, 454).
Rosenberg’s position would be definitively or strongly refuted if, described at the molecular level, there is no difference between sonic hedgehog’s behavior in the limb bud and the neural tube environments, i.e., if the relationship between lower-level and upper-level descriptions were truly one-many.  Then the F-rules of macromolecular biology, even in their maximally detailed characterization, would fail to predict a regularity at the developmental level.  However, the applicable F-rules, if more fully specified, are likely not the same in the limb bud and neural tube.  The end product of the sonic hedgehog signaling pathway is the regulation of Gli transcription factors.  Research has suggested that in order to regulate different forms of gene expression, these Gli factors require the presence of other transcription factors.  Some of these transcription factors may be tissue-specific.   For example, the Sox1 transcription factor plays a causal role in the development of the early neural tube, but is absent from the limb bud (Campbell, personal communication). In general, however, whether such molecular differences exist is an empirical matter, so I cannot say that such differences will always be found.​[12]​ 
Another example in which differences in ‘context’ have been spelled out molecularly involves 20-hydroxyecdysone (the following information is drawn from (Gilbert 2000, 562-564)).​[13]​  Researchers have known that this steroid hormone has a number of distinct effects in insects.  In the larval stage it causes molts, yet in the last stage (the metamorphic molt) it brings about the adult stage.  This has the form of Laubichler and Wagner’s (b) example above: ‘one molecule- many developmental effects.’  However, in the larval stage, the lipid Juvenile Hormone (JH) is present, and while it does not interfere with the larval molts, JH prevents the 20-hydroxyecdysone-induced changes in gene expression needed for metamorphosis.  Immediately before the final molt, JH production stops, and the body is better able to degrade existing JH.   In the absence of JH, 20-hydroxyecdysone is able to bring about the adult stage.  Thus, by taking into account the presence or absence of JH, we see that this is not a true one-many situation.  
20-Hydroxyecdysone has other varied effects: it causes some larval cells to differentiate (imaginal disk cells and differentiating neurons), while it causes others to die.  Again, this has the form of ‘one molecule- many developmental effects.’  But once again, there is a molecular basis for this difference.  20-Hydroxyecdysone does not bind to DNA itself; rather, it binds to receptors called EcR proteins.  There are three different kinds of EcR proteins (-A, -B1, and -B2).  All cells have all three types of EcR, but different cells have different relative concentrations of each.  The cells that are killed by 20-hydroxyecdysone have a relatively high concentration of EcR-B1, while the cells that differentiate have a relatively high concentration of EcR-A.  The difference in EcR concentrations—a purely molecular difference—accounts for the differing developmental effects of 20-hydroxyecdysone.  Of course, these two examples involving the differential influence of 20-hydroxyecdysone do not show that the reductionist is correct; but they do show that the kind of explanations the reductionist wants can be given and are being given in a few specific cases.
It appears to me that Laubichler and Wagner allow Rosenberg only a minimal or incomplete syntax, and then criticize him for it: “the simple observation that the hedgehog protein binds to a specific receptor does not contribute anything to an explanation of development” (2001, 64).  If this actually were Rosenberg’s position, it would not be worth discussing; but it seems that Rosenberg has should be allowed a much richer system of rules, though still couched exclusively in molecular language, to comprise a ‘molecular syntax.’  As I understand it, the reductionist view that the embryo is computable and that development is ‘reducible’ to molecular biology does not require that all genes be like eyeless, which can be activated in a relatively context-independent fashion (Rosenberg 1997, 453).  That would simply make the syntax and hence the reduction simpler. 
So what would an example of a true one-many relationship between the molecular and developmental levels actually look like?  That is, if one accepts my argument that Laubichler and Wagner’s empirical examples fail to refute Rosenberg’s claims about the possibility of reduction conclusively, what sort of research findings would show that the reduction of developmental to molecular biology is impossible?  Here is one possibility: we need a case where the same set of molecules acts differently in two different contexts, where that difference between the contexts cannot be spelled out at the molecular level, i.e., it cannot be captured in terms of molecular F-terms and F-rules.  This would be a case in which we would need to assume either predicates or inferential rules couched in non-molecular language in order to capture the upper-level regularity.  If development could not be predicted without these extra additions, then Rosenberg’s reductionist thesis would be disproved.  Where might we search for such disproof?  Laubichler and Wagner repeatedly chastise Rosenberg for downplaying the importance of the fact that developing organisms “have a three-dimensional structure and are context-sensitive in space and time” (2001, 58, cf. 62, 65).  This appeal to structure and spatial organization is a time-honored standard among antireductionists in biology (for historical references, see Shaffner 1993, 415-7).  But what does this admonishment amount to—what sort of empirical finding about spatial organization could disprove the reductionist?  I offer answers to this question in section 4. 

4. Evidence against reduction
Taking our cue from Laubichler and Wagner’s invocation of the importance of structure, we can imagine a toy example of one type of finding that would realize a one-many relationship between the molecular and developmental levels, simply to see concretely what form strong evidence against Rosenberg would take.  Suppose we have a fertilized egg which is, from a molecular point of view, spherically symmetric; that is, if we cut the egg in half along any great circle, a purely molecular description of the two halves cannot distinguish one half from the other.  In short, assume the two halves are molecularly identical. ​[14]​   Here is the crucial step: now suppose the half ‘on the bottom of the organism’ always becomes X while the half ‘on the top of the organism’ always becomes Y—where which half is the ‘bottom’ is determined by the orientation of the embryo with respect to gravity, or perhaps with respect to the mother’s uterus in certain animals.  We would then have, ex hypothesi, two situations that are molecularly identical (the two halves of the embryo), but developmentally different.  We could not ‘compute—i.e., predict—the development of the embryo’ on a purely molecular basis, if it was necessary to refer to organism-level attributes—‘top’ and ‘bottom’—to predict the course of development.  If researchers found that in fact the direction with respect to the uterus determines part of development, we would have to add a gross-level spatial term and spatial rule in addition to the molecular syntax in order to account for why one part of the embryo becomes X and the other becomes Y.  And at that point Rosenberg’s thesis would perhaps be shown false: molecular syntax alone would not be sufficient to describe and predict developmental morphology.
This toy example has partial analogues in the history of biology.  Driesch thought that in the very early zygote (up to the third division) “all blastomeres are equivalent, and that the position of each blastomere in the segmenting egg determines in general the fate of that blastomere.  If the blastomeres could be interchanged as can the individual marbles of a heap, then the fate of each would be determined by its new position in the whole” (Morgan, 1897).  The analogy is not exact, because Dreisch was arguing to the conclusion that all the early blastomeres are qualitatively identical, not from it ex hypothesi, as in my toy example.  Another analogous example comes from Eduard Pflüger’s experiments on the frog embryo.  By rotating the embryos, Pflüger found that the plane of the initial cleavage was always orthogonal to the direction of gravity, even though the unicellular frog egg is visibly not homogenous: light and dark areas can be distinguished (Maienschein 1991, 47). 
Of course, the imagined zygote in the toy example still consists of ‘nothing but’ molecules—there are no additional entities or properties that appear in the upper level that lack a molecular constitution.  However, I claimed above that developmental reductionism ‘would perhaps be shown false’ by such an imagined finding.  Why ‘perhaps’?  The subtle issue of what terms, in particular, should be allowed in the molecular vocabulary determines whether such a hypothesized example would refute Rosenberg or not.  If spatial predicates at the level of the entire organism (i.e., ‘bottom half of the zygote’) are not allowed in the reducing vocabulary, then such an example would deal developmental reductionism a heavy blow.  So what terms, exactly, should be allowed in the molecular F-terms?  The F-terms for Drosophila will certainly include ‘hedgehog,’ ‘Juvenile Hormone,’ and other macromolecule names.  Will the vocabulary also include spatiotemporal predicates?  Well, because molecular processes occur in space and time, I believe we should at least allow spatiotemporal predicates at the molecular scale to be included in the molecular vocabulary VM.  Thus, for example, we should consider completely molecular the sentence ‘Molecule B is between neighboring molecules A and C.’ What justifies including such terms?  If we do not include spatiotemporal terms in VM, then the anti-reductionist ‘wins’ automatically, but it would be an unilluminating and hollow victory: there is simply no way to reduce ‘between’ to any set of claims about macromolecules and macromolecular mechanisms, without appeal to spatiotemporal concepts.  However—and this is the subtle point—some statements about spatial configuration should perhaps not be allowed into the reducing vocabulary.  For example, ‘left side of the organism’ makes reference to a spatial scale or level of aggregation (namely, that of ‘organism’) far greater than that of molecules, and thus should probably not be considered part of VM.  The justification for this is two-fold: first, the entities and processes molecular biology typically studies are not at the scale of the entire organism.  Secondly, as mentioned above, the appeal to the significance of gross spatial organization is a classical tenet of anti-reductionists in the biological sciences, and the above toy example attempts to give that abstract claim specific ‘cash value.’  And if we allow the reductionist to co-opt tenets that partially define anti-reductionism, then the distinction between the two camps disappears.  
In any case, exactly which terms will be included in VM and which will not is, in part, a matter of decision—but this decision is not necessarily arbitrary.  We must decide the question: how rich will we let the reducing vocabulary and rules become, on the one hand, and still consider the reduction successful or significant, on the other? The explanatory ‘power’ of a reduction is (ceteris paribus) inversely proportional to the richness of the reducing vocabulary. For a moment, consider reductionism debates generally.  Suppose that every time an anti-reductionist found an upper-level rule or term that could not be reduced to lower-level rules and terms, the reductionist is allowed simply to incorporate those upper-level terms and rules into her reducing theory.  Then the reductionist would always claim victory; thus, allowing this maneuver in general seems unfair to the anti-reductionist.  To make matters concrete, consider the logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics, which aims to reduce mathematics to logic.  It turns out that if one does not assume the axiom of infinity (very roughly, ‘there exist an infinite number of things’), much of classical mathematics cannot be derived from the predicate calculus.  If one claims that the axiom of infinity is an axiom of predicate logic, then one can claim to have reduced much more of classical mathematics to predicate logic.  However, many people would not accept that the axiom of infinity is a logical truth.  The ‘statistical postulate’ in attempts to reduce thermodynamics to statistical mechanics plays a role analogous to the axiom of infinity above: we can decide to add it into the F-rules, and thereby the derivation of thermodynamics becomes possible.  But again, the statistical postulate is not commonly accepted as a part of statistical mechanics.  My present suggestion is that allowing ‘left side of the organism’ to be considered part of the F-terms is analogous to allowing the statistical postulate and the axiom of infinity (or worse, the axiom of choice) to be F-rules in their respective attempted reductions. The analogy is not perfect, however, because the respective domains of ‘classical mathematics’ and ‘logic’ at the beginning of the 20th century, and ‘thermodynamics’ and ‘statistical mechanics’ in the 19th, were probably more clearly defined than ‘molecular biology’ and ‘developmental biology’ are today.
However, if one rejects the above considerations, and believes that spatial predicates at the super-molecular scale are acceptable elements of the reducing basis, then the imagined zygote would not tell against Rosenberg’s thesis.  And one philosopher who may accept this is actually one of the staunchest modern advocates of reductionism in the biomedical sciences: Schaffner.  He argues that many putative reductions are “interlevel”; that is, many different levels can be called upon in a reductive explanation, including, it seems, the reduced level (1993, 491).  However, it appears Schaffner considers such interlevel reductions “partial” or “piecemeal” (ibid., 495): not all entities at the targeted level are, in fact, reduced.  Thus, on the grounds that a partial reduction should still count as a reduction, one preeminent reductionist might not consider this imagined finding to be a good argument against reductionism.  But this strikes me as mildly perverse sense of ‘reduction.’ If partial reductions count as reductions, then the strong logicist program, despite what virtually everyone believes, did succeed in reducing classical mathematics to logic, since it reduced a fragment of classical mathematics to logic.  I think and hope that Schaffner does not intend this consequence, but rather simply wants to be able to fit reductions-in-progress into his abstracted model(s) of reduction in general (1993, 496).
There are actual research findings similar to the toy example described above that appear to display the one-many structure between upper and lower levels.  One comes from studies of anterior-posterior axis formation in early chick development (Gilbert 2000, 351; Kochav and Eyal-Giladi 1971, Eyal-Giladi and Fabian 1980).  In the early chick, the only portion that undergoes cleavage is called the blastodisc, a radially symmetric group of cells about 2-3 mm in diameter; the vast majority of the egg is composed of yolk.  If an egg is artificially removed from the hen’s uterus early (tenth hour after fertilization), the development of its anterior-posterior axis can be studied in the laboratory; in nature, the axis is already determined at the time of laying (twentieth hour).  In these early eggs, the blastodisc, consisting of thousands of cells, is always observed to rise to the top of the egg with respect to the direction of gravity, for it is less dense than the yolk.  However, in nature, the egg would roll down the uterus at 10 to 15 rotations per hour.  Because of this rotation, the blastodisc does not sit at the top of the egg: weakly adhesive forces exist between the blastodisc and the yolk below it, which tries to carry the blastodisc along with it in the direction of rotation.  However, the blastodisc does not simply rotate with the egg, because the blastodisc’s lower density still pushes it back towards the top.  The result of these two countervailing forces is that the blastodisc maintains an oblique or tilted position: it does not sit at the top of the egg with respect to gravity, but its position is shifted slightly in the direction of rotation.  Thus, within the blastodisc, there is a highest point and a lowest point with respect to gravity.  And these locations are crucial for the determination of the anterior-posterior axis: “the posterior part of the embryo will always form at the highest point and the head at the lowest point of the blastodisc” (Kochav and Eyal-Giladi 1971, 1028).  This regularity holds true even if, in the laboratory, experimenters do not allow the egg to rotate at all, and simply manually displace the blastodisc from its position at the top of the egg.  Furthermore, if the rotation or manual displacement is in a different direction from what usually occurs in nature, then the regularity still holds in that case as well.  That is, the very same cells, which would have formed the posterior end had they been at the highest point of the blastodisc, will form the anterior end when they are at the lowest point of the blastodisc.  Also, if the blastodisc is allowed to sit, horizontally, at the top of the egg, axialization will not occur (Eyal-Giladi et al. 1994, 271).
Prima facie, this appears to have the form of a one-many relation between lower and upper levels.  The same cell will become the head or the tail, depending on its location with respect to the whole organism; this is similar to the toy example, in which molecularly identical entities had different fates, depending on their location in the whole organism.  Now, I see at least two ways the reductionist could respond to this example.  First, she could simply add this developmental regularity and its terms into her F-rules and F-terms of the reducing science, molecular biology.  Now, this move does not lead to a logical contradiction or a conflict with experiment, but it seems suspect nonetheless. Recall the above discussion of the logicist program in mathematics. Should the logicist be allowed to say that the axiom of infinity is a logical truth?  Many think not; and this situation seems to me analogous to a developmental reductionist who, when faced with potential counter-examples, simply incorporates them into her reducing vocabulary and rules.  
The second response a reductionist could have to this example is to assert that, either in fact or in principle, the correlation between the location of a cell within the blastodisc and its eventual fate is merely accidental, in the sense that it is different molecules surrounding the top and bottom of the blastodisc that are truly causing the axis determination.  This is a good reply, and the matter can only be definitively resolved by experiment.​[15]​  Unfortunately for the anti-reductionist, current evidence strongly suggests the types of yolk particles, the ‘maternal vegetal determinants,’ are different at the top and bottom of the blastodisc (Eyal-Giladi 1997, 2285).  Because of physical considerations, the yolk molecules around the top of the blastoderm must be lighter than those molecules around the bottom (Gilbert 2000, 351).  
So do these considerations show that this example is not evidence against the reductionist?  I do not think so; but they do show that this evidence may not be as straightforward as originally hoped (i.e., not simply ‘supervenience fails’).  Assume for the sake of argument that the lighter yolk molecules at the top of the blastoderm are causally responsible for determining that that site becomes the posterior end.  One can still ask: why are those particular molecules are in contact with each other, i.e., how did they come to be spatially proximate? That is, we can ask: what is responsible for arranging the yolk molecules differentially in that way, and what is responsible for the blastodisc’s position? And those answers will not be couched in terms of molecular interactions.  Rather, we have to expand our scale to that of the whole organism: lighter molecules will rise to the top of the egg, and heavier ones will sink to the bottom due to gravity.  Further, the obliqueness of the disc, which establishes one end of the blastodisc as ‘top’ and the other as ‘bottom,’ is also explained by the countervailing forces of gravity and adhesion acting on the blastodisc, which is a gross cytological entity.  Those two facts together explain why lighter molecules are in contact with one particular set of cell surfaces on the blastodisc.  We see that it is gravity, establishing ‘top’ and ‘bottom,’ that accounts for the locations of the blastodisc and of the various kinds of yolk, and therefore (via different molecular interactions at the top and bottom) for the determination of the anterior-posterior axis. 
This is not a straightforward case of supervenience failing, since the yolk molecules in contact with the blastodisc cell surface are different at the top and bottom of the blastodisc.  But what explains why this difference exists?  This may nonetheless be an upper-level regularity that cannot be fully explained by lower-level mechanisms alone.  If we cannot use the terms ‘top’ and ‘bottom of the disc,’ we cannot explain why the yolk molecules are different in one part of the blastodisc than the other.  If we are allowed the terms ‘top’ and ‘bottom of blastodisc,’ we can predict the orientation of the anterior-posterior axis long before the yolk molecules are in place that cause the interactions leading to the specification of the posterior.  This is because, to reiterate, the spatial orientation of the egg with respect to gravity is what is responsible for getting the maternal vegetal molecules, as well as the blastodisc surface, where they need to be in order to specify and form the anterior-posterior axis.

5. Conclusion
Laubichler and Wagner’s polemic against the possibility of reducing developmental to molecular biology presents a series of detailed experimental findings that appear to impugn reductionism.  I have argued that, if one articulates the consequences of these empirical examples, they do not constitute a refutation of reductionism.  The reductionist can account for the many-one relationship that exists between the lower and upper levels by allowing the connections to be conditionals; thus, the reduction will be ‘complex,’ but not necessarily impossible. Also, I have argued that Laubichler and Wagner’s purported examples of one-many relations perhaps do not actually fit that description: what they call ‘one’ molecular situation would actually be, according to the reductionist, many.  Thus, the fact that the same molecule can have different behaviors under different molecular circumstances is not decisive evidence against Rosenberg’s reductionism.  Then I described one sort of empirical result that, if found, would refute reductionism.  Finally, I discussed an actual experimental result that challenges the reductionist’s belief that molecular processes alone can explain all the facts of development.  Laubichler and Wagner are clearly correct to claim that developmental processes are very dependent on the organization of their constituent molecules, but it is not clear exactly how this claim would refute Rosenberg and his ilk. However, my suggestion gives a more specific bite to Laubichler and Wagner’s recurrent assertion, typical of anti-reductionists, that the importance of spatiotemporal organization could impugn Rosenberg’s reductionist hopes.  I have attempted to convert their worry into a clearer formulation that is more conceptually precise, and which would impugn even the sophisticated reductionist, who attempts to show that all developmental phenomena can be explained by molecular biology.
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^1	  For a defense of the view that explanation invloves an irreducibly pragmatic component, see the very influential (van Fraassen, 1980), chapter 5: “The Pragmatics of Explanation.”
^2	  “Fundamentalism: the explanation of a feature of a system invokes factors from a different realm… and the feature to be explained is a result only of the rules operative in that realm” (1998, 45).
^3	  The difference between traditional term ‘reducing’ and Sarkar’s ‘fundamental’ is that the former could be purely formal (i.e., purely logical), whereas the latter is “substantive” (1998, 45). The validity of the formal/ substantive distinction is not my concern here.  
^4	  In these rules, DNA is not primary, either causally or ontologically.
^5	  ‘Connectability’ and ‘derivability’ are Nagel’s (1979, 354) terms; they have become standard.
^6	  Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, ‘reduction’ will abbreviate the specific ‘reduction of developmental biology to molecular biology’; similarly for ‘reductionism.’ 
^7	  However, the reductionist who accepts multiple-realizability may, depending on the particular reduction, be forced to accept that the ‘natural kinds’ at the reducing and reduced levels ‘cross-cut’ one another; see the remarks on Fodor two paragraphs down.
^8	  I thank Sandy Mitchell for alerting me to this point.
^9	  Evelyn Fox Keller forwarded a similar point against Rosenberg’s position (1999, 324).
^10	  This is Hull’s attitude, though expressed in the context of Mendelian genetics: “the same types of molecular mechanism can produce phenomena that must be characterized by different Mendelian predicate terms.  Hence, reduction is impossible” (1974, 39).
^11	  And scientists can be as interested as philosophers. Developmental biologist Igor Dawid claims: “There’s no way around knowing all the players and their interactions.  Eventually some people may throw up their hands and say it’s too complicated, but you have to know who talks to whom and how it works, or else you don’t understand it” (Schmidt 1994, 567).  (This article, “A Puzzle: How Similar Signals Yield Different Effects,” lists a number of researchers and laboratories attempting to understand how different effects arise from the same molecular pathway.)
^12	  But research is being done in this direction.  As a biologist working on Drosophila told me, “The idea that you need a combination of transcription factors (some that lie in specific signaling pathways and some that are tissue specific to transcriptionally activate genes) has come primarily from recent work in Drosophila.  There is some evidence for what these tissue specific factors in some cell types are, and that they work together with some signaling-specific transcription factors such as those found in the TGF-ﬂ, Wnt and EGF-receptor pathways” (Campbell, personal communication).
^13	  I thank Karen Arnold for pointing out this example.
^14	  This is an unrealistic assumption.  For example, in amphibians the animal-vegetal axis exists by the time oogenesis is complete (Eyal-Giladi 1997, 2285), so even the unfertilized egg is not spherically symmetric.  
^15	  I am imagining an experiment of the following sort: orient the blastodisc such that there is a highest point and a lowest point.  Then somehow switch the yolk surrounding the higher part of the blastodisc with the yolk surrounding the lower part—ideally, mirror-reflect the yolk about the diameter that separates the top of the blastodisc from the bottom.  Then if the regularity held, we would have good evidence that the spatial orientation is crucial; if the regularity were broken, then spatial orientation is not the fundamental determinant of anterior-posterior axis formation.
